. This case and those discussed in the text at notes 16-21 infra deal with issues of substantive arbitrability -whether or not the dispute was covered by the arbitration clause of the collective agreement. It has been persuasively argued that the task of providing standards for the guidance of the federal judiciary in this area is best done by Congress, and that therefore the Supreme Court should not have made the attempt itself. See Bickel & Welling-section 301 cases were to be derived from "[our] national labor laws."'6 The famed Steelworkers Trilogy, decided by the Court in 1960, added specific content to these standards. In two suits to compel arbitration 17 and one to enforce an arbitrator's award,18 the following propositions were established: since arbitration is a matter of contract, a court, and not the arbitrator, should find the obligation to arbitrate in the collective agreement, and must delimit the arbitrator's jurisdiction accordingly.19 Because of the nature of the collective agreement, the special competence of the arbitrator in applying it, and the belief that arbitration will lead to industrial peace -a significant tenet of our national labor policy -the principal canon of judicial construction of labor contracts adopted by the Court was a strong presumption in favor of arbitrability: unless a dispute is specifically excluded from the grievance clause, a court should consider it included.20 Since application of the presumption in favor of arbitrability will often result in parties being compelled to arbitrate disputes not clearly intended to be subject to arbitration, the contract rationale -that arbitration is a matter of agreement between private partieswill often be subordinated to this presumption.2' The degree of this subordination is exemplified by the Wiley case itself, for the Supreme Court in the initial segment of its opinion held that Wiley was obligated to arbitrate, although the company was not a party to the contract containing the arbitration As an example, in the Warrior case the union successfully sought to persuade a court to order arbitration on the question of whether the employer could contract out work. Yet the evidence was clear that in bargaining sessions the union had persistently attempted to get the employer to agree to make contracting out arbitrable, and had always failed. In an ordinary contract case this history would probably have been sufficient to induce a court not to order arbitration of the dispute, and in this case induced the district and circuit courts to find for the employer. It seems clear, however, that the union was not the type of creditor envisioned by the New York statute because it did not possess an existing cause of action against Interscience at the time of the merger. A labor contract does not guarantee employment for a specific term with a cause of action arising for damages if it is terminated prior to the period it is written to cover. Collective agreements provide only that as long as an employer operates the plant in substantially the same manner as when the contract was written, he is required to abide by the standards of the agreement. Should he choose to go out of business he is only liable to the union for the time worked by union members. The collective agreement is a contract at will. When Interscience terminated its operations, the agreement also terminated, and the union had no cause of action for monies it would have received had there been no merger. It is these monies the union was trying to get. As the union cannot be regarded as a creditor in the sense that the alleged debtor, Interscience, is not liable to it for money the union would have received had the contract been fully performed, it does not fit within the policy of the New York statute. The Court's holding that Wiley was required to arbitrate under the Interscience contract is, therefore, quite contrary to established contract principles.
It may be argued that when an employer has sold his business, but the plant is operated substantially as before, there is a legitimate interest in not requiring the union to go through the entire process of renegotiating the collective agreement. The buyer ought to assume the contract for the remainder of its term. This is clearly not the situation in Wiley, however, in that the union, instead of having forty employees organized in a small plant, had, after the merger, twenty-nine employees in a much larger working force in a different plant. 376 U.S. at 545. To apply the Interscience contract to Wiley is to ignore normal contract law, and the court recognized this. "While the principles of law governing ordinary contracts would not bind to a contract an unconsenting successor to a contracting party, a collective bargaining agreement is not an ordinary contract." Id. at 550.
23. This is by far the most common procedural breach. The preamble to the grievance section of the collective agreement provided that the section was intended to settle disputes between the employer and the employees or the union. Then followed explicit directions for how an employee should process a grievance; nothing was said of filing by the union. A dispute arose which directly affected an employee but he neglected to file a grievance. Since the dispute could have affected many other employees, the union attempted to file. The issue was whether the union could file at all, and if so, whether it did so in a reasonable manner.27 COMPLETE FAILURE TO COMPLY. The collective agreement provided that a party desiring arbitration must notify the other party in writing within twenty days of the failure of the intra-company grievance procedure. More than nine months after such a failure the union requested arbitration. In reply to the assertion of a procedural breach, the union argued that the employer's con- During 1961, the court, without recognizing a possibility of choice between alternate decision-makers, twice held that a union was excused from complying with grievance procedures and ordered arbitration of the substantive dispute.30 In 1962, without mentioning its prior rulings, the circuit court decided that compliance should be determined by an arbitrator.81
Courts which have recognized the problem of procedural arbitrability and have resolved the issue in favor of judicial decision usually rely on a contract rationale.32 This contract argument is based upon the notion that the collective agreement, and only the collective agreement, confers jurisdiction on the arbitrator, even when it contains a broad arbitration clause leaving all questions of contract interpretation or application to the arbitrator. The courts have reasoned that this jurisdiction may not be exercised unless the two conditions set by the parties have been met. First, the substantive dispute has been made arbitrable by the contract; second, the condition precedent to arbitration -compliance with the grievance procedures -has been fulfilled.33 Accordingly, the court must rule on whether there was compliance with the procedural requirements of the contract, or if not, whether the breach was excusable. Of course, the parties may have agreed to let the arbitrator rule on one or both of these conditions. But unless they have done so, and that agreement can be fairly found in the contract, the courts must decide. 34 Prior to Wiley, however, most courts holding procedural questions arbitrable have also claimed to rely on the collective agreement, specifically upon the standard broad arbitration clause giving the arbitrator jurisdiction over every dispute concerning the contract's interpretation or application.35 Courts then reasoned that, as the issue of procedural compliance clearly involved the interpretation or application of the agreement, the arbitrator had jurisdiction to 30 The cases which use the broad arbitration clause to make procedural compliance arbitrable seem, however, to be in conflict with Supreme Court holdings in the analogous area of substantive arbitrability.36 For example, a court could reason from a broad arbitration clause that the question of whether a particular dispute is covered by the clause also involves the interpretation or application of the agreement and is thus for the arbitrator to decide. But the Supreme Court has held that this question of substantive arbitrability must be judicially determined despite the presence of broad arbitration clauses.37 Procedural arbitrability, if viewed as a question of contract, is similar to substantive arbitrability; both involve the issue of whether the parties intended the particular dispute to be subject to arbitration. In the latter the question is whether the dispute is of the character intended to be arbitrated, while in the former the inquiry is which forum, court or arbitrator, was meant to determine questions of procedural compliance. Both issues may thus be analyzed as being concerned with the jurisdiction of the arbitrator established by the parties in their contract. If reasons were offered to distinguish the jurisdictional questions involved in procedural and substantive arbitrability, then the procedural arbitrability cases utilizing the broad clause might be reconciled with the Supreme Court cases on substantive arbitrability; however, no court has attempted to do so. Thus reasoning from a broad arbitration clause to make procedural compliance a question for an arbitrator would seem unwarranted.
In addition, it might be argued that a holding that questions of procedural compliance are arbitrable based on a broad arbitration clause is simply poor contract construction. Arbitration clauses are usually written to deal with grievances, which ". . . are almost always complaints against action taken or refused by the employer."38 It is clear that the issues of procedural compliance do not fall within this description of the type of dispute to be heard by an arbitrator. A broad arbitration clause standing alone does not seem to be sufficient evidence for a court to conclude that the parties intended procedural questions to be arbitrable. It might be maintained, however, that the grant of power to decide grievances necessarily comprehends the power to decide whether the case is properly before the arbitrator; an arbitrator as an ad-36. It should be noted that the terms substantive and procedural arbitrability are not analogous since they pose different issues to the court. Substantive arbitrability involves the issue of whether a given dispute was intended by the parties to be included in the arbitration clause. Procedural arbitrability requires the court to determine which decisionmaker, court or arbitrator, should determine the issue of procedural compliance. judicator should have jurisdiction to decide his own jurisdiction. The argument logically extended leads to the proposition that the parties intended the power to decide grievances to carry with it the power to decide all jurisdictional questions pertaining thereto. Parties, however, presumably contract in awareness of the law, and the law has always been that the jurisdictional issue of substantive arbitrability is not a question for the arbitrator but rather for the court.39 It seems anomalous to argue that the parties, recognizing this rule of substantive arbitrability, meant by their silence to create a different rule for procedural arbitrability. A more plausible reading of the contract would be that the arbitration clause does not speak to jurisdiction at all.40
One possible reason for the courts' ready acceptance of the contract rationale based on the existence of a broad arbitration clause is that initially it seems a plausible way to construe the contract, and, as the procedural claim has often been only one among a miscellany of contentions advanced by an employer to avoid arbitration, many courts may not have considered the issue important enough to warrant analysis in depth. A second explanation may be that courts which have relied on the broad arbitration clause have used the contract rationale to justify results reached on other grounds. Judges, for example, may have felt ill at ease deciding procedural compliance and may have preferred to leave the decision to the expertise of an arbitrator. Courts, however, are seldom reticent in the labor area to ascribe expertise to an arbitrator and remand cases to him for decision ;41 yet in questions of procedural arbitrability only one decision prior to Wiley suggested the rationale of expertise.42 It would seem that in general the courts were either unaware of the expertise argument or, for some reason, failed to articulate it.
In the Wiley case, the Supreme Court holding that procedural questions were arbitrable was rested on a policy base, and the Court placed no reliance The Court's conclusion that procedural compliance was an issue for the arbitrator implicitly relied upon the presumed special competence of the arbitrator to make this type of decision. Although not clearly articulated in the Supreme Court opinion,45 the argument based on the expertise of an arbitrator may be broken down into two specific considerations. Initially, it is frequently argued that the collective agreement is quite unlike other contracts.40 First, the contract attempts to govern complex relationships for a significant period of time. It therefore must be a somewhat general document which can be completely understood only with some specialized knowledge of the general background of industrial relations against which the parties contracted. Second, collective agreements are often written in haste under pressure of a strike and in moments of high tension. It is likely they will reflect the manner of their creation, tending to be imprecise and not susceptible of easy construction. In fact, it is often the intention of the parties to be ambiguous; a conflict at the bargaining table may be resolved through the drafting of a phrase capable of varying interpretations in the hope that a dispute will not arise or will be more easily settled in the future. Lastly, there are certain areas where the parties feel that specificity is unnecessary: Dean Shulman gives the example of discipline for cause.47 All of these factors make the collective agreement a very difficult document to construe. Only an arbitrator aware of the industrial context and the character of the parties can successfully deal with the contract, and courts ought not to try. This argument is not necessarily true in matters of procedure. Grievance provisions in collective agreements are basically the same, transcending industries and individual peculiarities.48 Essentially these provisions provide for [Vol.73:1459 cedural clauses would, moreover, seem to preclude the utilization of a second form of competence often attributed to arbitrators -the ability to act as a constructive policy maker free to find a creative solution in those areas where the result is not provided in the contract.53
A second facet of the expertise argument is suggested by the Supreme Court in the Wiley opinion. Justice Harlan felt that finding a procedural breach on the part of the union would not of itself end the matter; the decisionmaker must then decide whether the breach ought to cut off totally the union's right to arbitration or should instead be reflected in the arbitration award.54 A decision-maker faced with a question of reinstatement could, for example, find a procedural breach, decide to reach the merits despite it, and qualify or structure the award to reflect the breach by granting less back pay than the employee would have received had there been procedural compliance. The Court felt that as the arbitrator alone could grant flexible remedies, a judge would have to remand a case to the arbitrator whenever such structuring was desirable. As structuring is likely to be desirable in most instances,55 the great majority of cases would be sent to arbitration despite procedural breaches. Justice Harlan thus concluded that a court ought not to decide procedural questions since it would be unable to provide a satisfactory remedy. In addition, the duplication of effort which would result if the court and arbitrator both adjudicated questions concerning a breach was thought unnecessary and undesirable. The argument rests on two premises: awards should be structured, and courts ought not to structure.
If the union's obligation to comply with the grievance provisions is deemed promissory, the Court's first premise is clearly correct under traditional contract analysis. The breach of a promise will give rise to an action in damages; but unless a promise goes to the essence of the contract, its breach will not relieve the other party from performance.56 Should the promise to arbitrate be independent from the promise to comply with the grievance procedure, a breach of the latter will not necessarily defeat the right to arbitration, unless the breach made arbitration useless or impossible.57 But if the obligation to comply is considered as a condition precedent to arbitration, failure to comply will absolutely defeat the union's right to arbitration in the absence of waiver or estoppel on the part of the employer.58 The issue then is whether the obligation to comply with the grievance procedures is promissory or conditional, for if it is the latter no structuring of the remedy will be possible.
Whether an obligation is promissory or conditional depends on the intention of the parties as expressed in the collective agreement and the circumstances surrounding its formation and application.59 At times, collective agreements are quite specific. If the obligations spelled out in the grievance provisions are followed by language stating that failure to follow them will be an absolute bar to arbitration, it is very difficult to resist the conclusion that these obligations are conditional. This language was present in the Wiley agreement,60 as in other collective agreements,61 but was given no effect by the Court. The Court's ignoring of the absolute bar term seems unjustified since the phrase itself may be superfluous in most collective agreements. It does not seem reasonable to assume that the parties created an intricate and specific grievance procedure, and at the same time intended that the union could easily avoid it simply by requesting arbitration directly. If the obligation were promissory this would be the case, and the employer's only remedy would be on the promise, a remedy which is often hollow, since little or no damages flow from the union's breach.62 On the other hand, it would seem consistent with the probable intention of the parties -in the absence of specific language to the contrary -to read grievance provisions as conditions precedent. Arbitrators and courts, moreover, are virtually unanimous in holding that procedural breaches totally defeat the right to arbitrate unless they are de minimis or there is estoppel.63 Since the premise that awards should be structured flies An additional justification used by the Court to support its holding that procedural compliance was for the arbitrator was that, as procedural questions were so closely linked with the merits of the substantive disputes, for a court to decide issues of procedure would be to divide artificially and unnecessarily a dispute which should be treated as a whole.64 Accordingly, the Court remanded the procedural question to the arbitrator apparently in the belief that his expertise rendered him better able to provide informed judgment on the intertwined issues of procedure and substance.65 Yet the question of procedural compliance seems distinct from and unrelated to the merits of the substantive dispute. Whether or not the union had notice of an alleged violation, whether or not the employer's conduct excused the union from procedural compliance, or how to measure the allowable filing period in cases of purported continuing violations all seem to have no bearing on the underlying arbitrable substantive questions. Indeed, even in the context of the somewhat unique substantive arbitrability problems presented by the Wiley merger, issues of procedural compliance are still clearly separable from the substantive merits. The inquiry is simply as to the scope of the grievance provisions. This last point may be expanded. Assume a collective agreement provides for a complaint to the foreman as the first step in the grievance procedure. The employer decides to contract out a great deal of his work, and the union protests directly to him. When this is unsuccessful the union seeks to arbitrate. In response to an objection by the employer that the union failed to comply with the grievance provisions, a decision-maker could find that the dispute involved a matter of high company policy, that the foreman's decision could be of no help to the union, and that procedural compliance in this instance was unnecessary -the grievance provisions were simply not intended to cover this type of dispute, although the dispute itself may be arbitrable. So too in Wiley the Court could have found that the grievance provisions were not intended to resolve merger problems, and therefore the union's non-compliance was excusable. But in our hypothetical and in Wiley it is quite clear that a resolution of the procedural compliance question does not require a decision on the substantive meritswhether the employer could contract out, or whether merger terminated the collective agreement. It appears likely that in most than respect for the principle of freedom of contract. Because of employer resistance and the nature of an arbitration award it may be quite impractical to structure awards to reflect procedural non-compliance.
64. 376 U.S. at 557-58. 65 . If the dispute was susceptible of being treated as a whole, the Court could have avoided the artificial division mentioned in the text by deciding the entire case itself. The fact that the Court did not do so indicates a belief that considerations similar to those which impelled it to remand the substantive dispute to arbitration apply to procedural questions as well. One of these considerations is that of expertise. See note 45 supra. situations the procedural question is separable from the merits, and courts need not get involved in the latter when they decide the former. It still might be argued that even if procedural and substantive issues are severable, the special competence of the arbitrator would make him the most appropriate decision-maker in the procedural area. However, since the contract because of its explicitness plays a predominant role in the procedural area, and since courts seem capable of properly applying it, considerations of the arbitrator's presumed competence lose much force.66
The Supreme Court in Wiley offered a third reason for sending procedural questions to an arbitrator. It felt that requiring a judicial decision would unnecessarily delay the arbitration process.67 Allowing the parties to litigate procedural matters in court would provide them with the opportunity to "fractionate"68 disputes in which the substantive issue was clearly arbitrable by litigating the procedural and substantive issues in separate forums. Such fractionation, the Court felt, would only cause extensive delay and unnecessary costs.69 But disputes are equally "fractionated" when procedural compliance is undisputed and the issue is substantive arbitrability. Indeed, as the great majority of cases involve issues of substantive arbitrability, the Court's argument should apply with much greater force in the substantive area. Yet Justice Harlan explicitly reaffirmed Wiley's right to demand a judicial determination of all issues of substantive arbitrability. the fact that the absence of all presumptive language in Wiley makes the opinion incline even more strongly toward arbitration than the Trilogy. The Steelworkers' presumption may be rebutted by a showing of intent, but faced with the Court's language in Wiley it would seem that a party not only must demonstrate a clear intent to have a court decide procedural compliance, but also must overcome the precedential weight of the Wiley holding, which is not restricted to the particular facts but is phrased generally. Moreover, given the strength of the Trilogy presumption as it is applied by the Supreme Court,7' a holding which moves beyond the presumption would seem to have an effect indistinguishable from a rule of law. Finally, a clear declaration that procedural compliance is for the courts to determine is unlikely to be written into most collective agreements. Bargaining for an explicit clause directing courts to adjudicate a portion of the contract is likely to be a divisive issue in negotiation given the typical union fear of judicial intervention in the labor area.72 Since issues of procedural compliance are only remote contingencies when bargaining occurs, a request for an explicit provision involving the federal courts will probably not be made.
Read as creating a rule of law, the Supreme Court decision in Wiley seems to ignore the language of section 301. While section 301 is only a grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts to hear suits brought under collective agreements, it would seem that the section obligates the courts to decide all such suits.73 By announcing that procedural compliance is always for the arbitrator, the Supreme Court has, in effect, stated that it will no longer adjudicate this class of disputes arising within the ambit of the language of section 301. It seems unusual, moreover, for a court with a clear grant of jurisdiction to refuse to decide a class of disputes not because of traditional policies of judicial restraint, such as mootness, justiciability, or ripeness, but because of a belief that another decision maker would be more competent.74 This can be illus- ? 185(a) (1958) . It seems implicit in the language employed that any suit on a labor contract properly brought in a district court must be decided by that court. Since it is ridiculous to argue that a suit may be brought but not decided, a contrary interpretation of the section than that reached in the text would be that some suits for violation of contracts may not be brought in any district court. As the section provides no guides for which suits may or may not be brought, and as it seems phrased to allow all such union-employer actions, reading it to allow the courts to refuse to hear some of them appears a strained interpretation of the language Congress used.
74. When courts refuse to decide cases on the ground that they involve political questions, they are, in effect, remanding the parties to the political process. But this kind of trated by imagining the reception a state court would receive if, in a traditional contract action, it remanded the parties to commercial arbitration under penalty of contempt of court and without reference to their agreement because an arbitrator was thought more competent to render decision and because such remand might produce other administrative efficiencies.
Although the Wiley decision thus seems to disregard the language of section 301, support for the Court's holding can be sought in the basic policy objective of the Labor Management Relations Act, that of achieving industrial peace.75 As it is often thought that arbitration produces industrial peace,76 it might be argued that the Court properly construed section 301 in Wiley to effectuate this goal 77 by forcing the parties to arbitrate questions of procedural compliance. But it has been persuasively argued that the quest for industrial peace through arbitration is a futile one. Forcing the parties to arbitrate deeply felt grievances they did not agree to arbitrate will not prevent conflict but only transfer it from the period during the contract to the time when the contract expires.78
There is, moreover, a more fundamental objection to reading section 301 to favor arbitration because it prevents industrial strife. Such a reading seems to be contrary to the scheme of the Labor Management Relations Act itself. Congress was deeply concerned with industrial peace, to be sure, but in seeking to achieve this goal it created an explicit regulatory scheme. One major method by which Congress sought to achieve industrial peace was through the creation of a system of unfair labor practices administered by the NLRB which placed limitations on the use of economic force by employers and unions. More relevant in the Wiley context is the second major congressional strategy for achieving industrial peace, the duty to bargain in good faith embodied in section 8(a) (5).79 In other contexts the Supreme Court has construed section 8(a) (5) as limiting the role of the NLRB and the federal judiremand is unaccompanied by compulsion; the parties do not have to lobby in a legislature or else face contempt of court. In Wiley, the parties must go to an arbitrator or go to jail, and it is this fact that makes the Court's remand to another institution so unusual. 77. The Court did not specifically mention industrial peace as a factor underlying its holding on procedural arbitrability. But it was clearly a factor in the holding, dealing with substantive arbitrability, 376 U.S. at 549, and seems to run through the entire opinion. And in so far as the Court remanded issues of procedural compliance to the arbitrator because it thought them indistinguishable from substantive questions, the industrial peace basis of the substantive holding was probably meant to apply as well to the ruling on procedure.
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